Why Don't People Like Tom Friedman?

OPINION: "In the Age of Pirates," by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 15 April 2008; and "Another Friedman Special," by Hooman Majd, Huffington Post, 15 April 2009

This is not the great age of diplomacy.

But this is increasingly an age of pirates, failed states, nonstate actors and nation-building — the stuff of snipers, drones and generals, not diplomats.

As such, I fear we are sliding into commitments in Afghanistan and Pakistan without a real national debate about the ends or the means or the exits. That is a recipe for trouble.

Once again, Tom Friedman takes a complicated topic and makes it understandable for folks that don't work in the foreign policy or national security fields. In this case, Friedman posits that the U.S. has four big problem countries -- Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea -- and no good solutions, or solutions that require more than the U.S. is willing to invest. The Obama administrations solution is to do just enough to avoid collapse but not enough to solve problems, which is really no solution. This solution is essentially just kicking the can down the road with hope that time will solve the problem.

If instead the students at Friedman's school are taught that it's not about pulling levers or demanding things of foreigners, but about negotiating according to the culture and customs of both parties, of understanding that problems cannot be solved in this "flat world" without considering the vital interests of all parties, then we might have a shot. It's not, as Mr. Friedman fears, about adopting a "middle ground," it's about fundamental change, as Mr. Obama promised in his campaign and as he is slowly, but surely, delivering. Iran, for one, appears to be patiently waiting.

Hooman Majd makes some good points in his "rebuttal" of Friedman. However, I think he misses Friedman's main point: the unwillingness of the U.S. to make the appropriate investment to solve problems in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea. Ultimately, his rational argument is lost in the petty sniping and, borderline, professional jealousy he directs toward Friedman.

Contemplating the 2006 Hizballah-Israeli War

National Security: "Short '06 Lebanon War Stokes Pentagon Debate," by Greg Jaffe, Washington Post, 6 April 09; and "The Sacred Leviathan," by Thomas P.M. Barnett, thomaspmbarnett.com, 7 April 09

The below excerpt is taken from a short paper I wrote in the Fall of 2006 for a masters course in national security studies. The above references make for interesting comparisons on the importance of this war.

“The victory that Hizballah achieved in Lebanon will have earthshaking regional consequences that will have an impact much beyond the borders of Lebanon itself.” (Yasser Abuhilalah, Jordanian Daily Al Ghad, 15 August 2006)

The recent success of the terror group Hizballah against the Israeli army, which supposedly is pound for pound the best army in the world, has caused many security experts to take pause. For thirty-four days Hizballah fought the Israeli army to a draw; something that would have been unfathomable in previous Middle East conflicts given the advanced nature of Israeli weapons and tactics. Some would argue that Hizballah is not a state sponsored terror group and falls more in line with the above articulated networked terror group. However, Hizballah’s recent war with Israel suggests that, while Hizballah does not draw its political ideology from a state sponsor, it most assuredly receives significant monetary and military weapons and training support from a state sponsor (Iran and Syria) and draws significant environmental support from its physical presence in a state (Lebanon). The achievement of Hizballah suggests that a new emerging organizational trend has surfaced which could serve as a template for future Middle Eastern terror groups.

Formed in 1982 by Shiite militants and Iranian Revolutionary Guards to fight the Israeli invasion of the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, Hizballah has morphed into a complex organization. According to Fawaz Trabulsi, a Lebanese professor of militia studies, the current Hizballah organization is compartmentalized, “They have a military and intelligence organization totally separated from the political organization.” (Cody) This compartmentalization along with a number of other organizational standards within Hizballah contributed to the success the terror group experienced in their recent war with Israel.

Hizballah’s strongest weapon is the organization and discipline of its supporters. Hizballah is assessed to have as many as 3,000 highly trained “regular” army members and another 10,000 to 12,000 supporters throughout southern Lebanon who provide logistical and military support. According to Timor Goskel, a longtime adviser of UN forces in Lebanon, after each Israeli strike in the recent conflict, Hizballah workers swept in and cleared away rubble from streets and blown-up bridges (Jervis). These actions showed a complex level of coordination not seen in the civil war of the 1970’s and ‘80’s (Jervis).

Additionally, the 3,000 regular Hizballah army fighters displayed a level of dedication and training not experienced by any force the Israeli army had fought. According to Brigadier General Nehushtan, a member of the Israeli army’s general staff, the Hizballah leadership carefully studied military history, including the Vietnam War, and set up a training program with help from Iranian intelligence and military officers with years of experience in the Iran-Iraq war (Cody). The training was matched to weapons that proved effective against the Israeli army equipment (Cody). The Hizballah fighters were armed with sophisticated Russian anti-tank weapons and thousands of missiles and rockets all controlled by sophisticated computerized command posts (Jervis).

Finally, the Hizballah social welfare program within Lebanon almost assures the terror group of continued success following the massive destruction the Israeli forces inflicted during the war. The group has an extensive network of hospitals, clinics, and schools. The charity work by the group has created a zealous following and makes Hizballah a “formidable political force in the region.” (Jervis)

The recent Hizballah war with Israel has brought to the forefront a template for a new state sponsored terror group. In this example, Hizballah, backed by Iranian and Syrian financing and military training and weapons, along with environmental support of the Lebanese populace, executed a thirty-four day war in which the mighty Israeli armed forces were fought to a draw; possibly changing the balance of power in the Middle East.