Potential Afghanistan Tipping Point?

AFGHANISTAN: “We’re Sick of War: A Taliban Leader Risks His Life to Point Out a New Route to Peace,” by Tom Coghlan, London Times, 15 April 2009

Facing another bloody summer of fighting in Helmand province, the Taliban commander uttered words that could cost him his life. “We all want peace. We want to put down our guns,” he said quietly.

As the conflict enters its eighth summer Nato is hoping that it can exploit such popular disillusion. Mullah Mansoor (not his real name), however, is simply looking for a way out. “Local people do not like the Taliban or the Western forces, they even don’t like us local Taliban” he conceded. “They say to us, ‘if you want to go to Paradise fight in the desert, fight in the mountains but don’t fight in my house’. My wish is just to have peace and security in my area.”

If Mansoor’s position is widely held within the Taliban community, this is the type of fissure that the U.S. military will exploit.

The article states that Mansoor is a “…mid-level Taliban commander,” which begs the question: How widely held is his position within the Taliban?”

There are a number of challenges to solving the AF-PAK problem, every opportunity to create daylight between the Taliban and the people of Afghanistan, and the Taliban and the U.S. goal of a stable region should be exploited. After all, exploiting mid-level leader disenchantment with their current situation is how the Awakening movement started in Iraq.

In non-conventional military operations it is exceedingly difficult to know when and where opportunities for success will present themselves, and even more difficult to measure the effectiveness of those opportunities once identified. It’s difficult to know where the “tipping point” will be reached, and what little pieces of the puzzle will lead to it.

Also see Measuring NATO Effectiveness in Afghanistan?

Why Don't People Like Tom Friedman?

OPINION: "In the Age of Pirates," by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 15 April 2008; and "Another Friedman Special," by Hooman Majd, Huffington Post, 15 April 2009

This is not the great age of diplomacy.

But this is increasingly an age of pirates, failed states, nonstate actors and nation-building — the stuff of snipers, drones and generals, not diplomats.

As such, I fear we are sliding into commitments in Afghanistan and Pakistan without a real national debate about the ends or the means or the exits. That is a recipe for trouble.

Once again, Tom Friedman takes a complicated topic and makes it understandable for folks that don't work in the foreign policy or national security fields. In this case, Friedman posits that the U.S. has four big problem countries -- Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea -- and no good solutions, or solutions that require more than the U.S. is willing to invest. The Obama administrations solution is to do just enough to avoid collapse but not enough to solve problems, which is really no solution. This solution is essentially just kicking the can down the road with hope that time will solve the problem.

If instead the students at Friedman's school are taught that it's not about pulling levers or demanding things of foreigners, but about negotiating according to the culture and customs of both parties, of understanding that problems cannot be solved in this "flat world" without considering the vital interests of all parties, then we might have a shot. It's not, as Mr. Friedman fears, about adopting a "middle ground," it's about fundamental change, as Mr. Obama promised in his campaign and as he is slowly, but surely, delivering. Iran, for one, appears to be patiently waiting.

Hooman Majd makes some good points in his "rebuttal" of Friedman. However, I think he misses Friedman's main point: the unwillingness of the U.S. to make the appropriate investment to solve problems in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea. Ultimately, his rational argument is lost in the petty sniping and, borderline, professional jealousy he directs toward Friedman.

Holbrooke and Mullen's Af-Pak Trip

Diplomatic: “The Diplomatic Surge: Can Obama’s Team Tame the Taliban?,” by Joe Klein, Time.com, 9 April 2009; “A Short Fuse in Pakistan,” by David Ignatius, Washington Post, 10 April 2009; and “Holbrook of South Asia,” by Matthew Kaminski, Wall Street Journal, 11 April 2009

In a recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af-Pak), Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, President Obama’s special envoy to the region, and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took Obama’s new “regional” Af-Pak strategy to the people of both countries.

What Holbrooke and Mullen learned was not necessarily unique, but what was unique was who they learned it from. Instead of the usual round of private meetings with government officials, which were conducted, additional meetings with farmers, tribal leaders, women legislators, rule-of-law advocates, journalists, the local diplomatic corps, and religious leaders provided the two with the best insight into the complexities of the Af-Pak problem.

What they learned in Afghanistan

• U.S. military plan for developing other than opium crops is undermining a USAID plan to do the same thing
• U.S. Army National Guard farmer-soldier teams are having a positive impact in remote Afghan districts – helping to plant and protect crops
• Afghans believe the Taliban is being supported by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which is supported by American funding
• There is a growing comparison by the Afghan people of the U.S. military to the Russian military as a result of collateral deaths from air strikes and direct action raids

What they learned in Pakistan

• The Zardari government is unwilling to admit the extent of Pakistan’s terror problem
• U.S. Predator drone strikes are alienating the population
• U.S. should channel aid through the tribal chiefs, rather than the Pakistani government
• U.S. should train the Frontier Corps, rather than rely on the Pakistani army, who are seen as outsiders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
• To curb the militant Islamic madrassas, the U.S. should help improve public schools in the region

During the trip, Mullen repeated on multiple occasions, “We’ve developed the best counterinsurgency capability in the world.”

The key tenants of that counterinsurgency capability are to protect the public and build civil order. Exactly the types of things that would resolve the majority of the issues highlighted above.

Obama's Plan for Afghanistan

Afghanistan: "Obama Outlines Afghan Strategy," by Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, 28 March 2009

On 27 March, President Obama outlined his anxiously awaited new plan for dealing with the declining situation in Afghanistan. Obama made it clear that his primary objective is to create a country stable and strong enough to prevent al Qaeda from reoccupying Afghan territory.

That's a significantly scaled down approach from the Bush administration, which sought the lofty goal of creating a stable democracy in Afghanistan.

Not surprisingly, Pakistan is front-and-center in Obama's approach. In a speech outlining the Afghan strategy Obama said, "Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken -- one way or the other -- when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets."

Additionally, the strategy contains a regional approach. Obama said he plans to bring together "all who should have a stake in the region," including Iran, Russia, China, and India.

Keeping with the theme of narrowing the optic, within Afghanistan, Obama said he intends to focus on government incompetence, opium cultivation and heroin trafficking, and a poorly equipped and trained army.

A few thoughts:
-Narrowing the focus is obviously the correct approach at this stage in the game. A stable Afghanistan is a reasonable goal. Creating a flourishing democracy is much too broad.
-Zeroing in on Pakistan is one of the key factors in cutting off safe havens for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters attacking into Afghanistan.
-A regional approach sounds like a great idea, and makes for great PR, however, I'll be watching carefully to see if there is any traction in actually moving this lofty goal forward.
-Focusing on government incompetence within Afghanistan is going to be challenging. I've seen some reporting that suggests that the U.S. may move to support regional governance at the expense of the central government.
-Stemming opium cultivation and heroin trafficking is a no win situation because drug profits account for the overwhelming majority of GNP in Afghanistan.
-Building up poorly equipped and trained security forces is actually reasonable, and we have plenty of experience to draw from.

In the end, building up Afghanistan's security forces is the near-term Obama plan action item that is, realistically, likely to be achieved and pay the best return on investment.

Also, see:
"Measuring NATO Effectiveness in Afghanistan?"
"Pakastan's Nawaz Sharif: Friend or Foe?"
"Afghanistan Roundup"

Measuring NATO Effectiveness in Afghanistan?

Afghanistan: “NATO Can’t Measure Afghan War Performance: General,” by Andrew Gray, Reuters, 24 March 2009

How does NATO measure the effectiveness of operations in Afghanistan? Apparently, they don’t – according to NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen John Craddock.

NATO has no reliable way to assess its performance in the war in Afghanistan even as the United States prepares to announce the results of an Afghan strategy review, the alliance's top commander said on Tuesday.

Craddock said his headquarters had tried to find ways to measure factors, such as security and the effectiveness of Afghan authorities, but the task had proven "overwhelming".

"Right now, our assessments of progress are anecdotal and they vary daily, weekly, with whoever makes the observation and where they are making them," Craddock told a hearing of the Senate's armed services committee.

The above statements are very telling of the difficulties that lie ahead for U.S. troops “surging” into Afghanistan.

Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are military parlance for tracking how a campaign is progressing. The military campaign is usually broken into phases, and MOEs allow the commander to decide when a campaign has transitioned from one phase to the next. Each phase usually has certain metrics that, when met, signal success and transition.

It’s quite telling when the overall commander of NATO forces tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that he has no way of measuring how his campaign is progressing – no way of verifying the impact his forces are having on the country.

Hmm… What does that signal? We’ve been operating in Afghanistan for eight years now, and still don’t know how to quantify the definition of success there.

Pakastan's Nawaz Sharif: Friend or Foe?

Pakistan: "U.S. Weighs Sharif As Partner In Pakistan," by Jim Perlez, New York Times, 25 March 2009

The big question Perlez poses in this article is: Can the U.S. trust Nawaz Sharif? Sharif is a former two-time prime minister (1990-1993 and 1997-1999) who:

1. Once pressed for Islamic law for Pakistan
2. Tested a nuclear bomb
3. Was accused of undemocratic behavior (whatever that means...)

These things would seem counter to what the U.S. would desire, but...

"Some diplomats and analysts argue...that Mr. Sharif’s affinity with the Islamic parties could now be an asset as Washington tries to win Pakistani support to fight the militants. 'We, and all sensible Pakistanis, need the support of Saudi Arabia and the more moderate Islamist parties, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, if we are ever going to tame the jihadis,' said a former American ambassador to Pakistan, Robert B. Oakley. 'Nawaz’s good standing with them is very, very important.'"

"Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, said Washington’s suspicions of Mr. Sharif might actually be helpful. 'He is sufficiently distanced from the United States to be a credible partner in the eyes of Pakistanis,' she said."

One thing is certain, the status quo is not working in Pakistan. The situation continues to deteriorate, and Pakistan has been identified as THE big contributing factor to the decline in the security situation in Afghanistan. I'm no Pakistan expert, but it would seem now is a good time to try something new.

Afghanistan Roundup

Afghanistan: "U.S. Weighs Taliban Strike Into Pakistan," by David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 18 March 2009 and "Obama Seeks Vastly Expanded Afghan Security Force to Help Stabilize the Nation," by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 19 March 2009

A few quick thoughts on the these two articles. In the Sanger/Schmitt piece the authors look at two main issues: 1. Should the U.S. strike Taliban militants outside of the tribal areas of Pakistan; and 2. The options Obama has for going forward with Afghanistan.

On the first issue, Obama must decide if it's prudent to strike Taliban (and al Qaeda) militants outside the federally administered tribal areas, more specifically in the populated city of Quetta in the Baluchistan province (see map). With the continued lethal success of Predator strikes in the tribal areas, reporting is suggesting that Taliban militants are migrating into the Baluchistan province, which is under central government control.

Evidently, Gen Patraeus (Central Command) and LtGen Lute (NSC Directorate for Afghanistan and Iraq) have recommended widening the strikes into the Baluchistan province. They see an opportunity to exploit the success of strikes in the tribal areas, which have caused other militants to come out of hiding and move. By moving, the militants are much more vulnerable to military action.

The key sticking point would be whether to risk further inflaming the Pakistani populace with an expansion of strikes into central government controlled territories. There is already significant heartburn with the strikes in the federally administrated tribal areas, which Pakistan says violates it sovereignty.

I would tend to agree with expanding the strikes. If you have the enemy on the run, and the Pakistan government won't, or can't, exploit this success, than the U.S. military should feel obliged to take every advantage necessary for success.

The second issue in the Sanger article deals with Obama's options for moving forward with Afghanistan. Sanger identifies three options available to Obama:

1. Scale back American ambitions and simply assure Afghanistan does not become a sanctuary for terrorists
According to a senior diplomat, "We are taking this [Afghanistan decision] back to the fundamental question: Can you ever get a central government in Afghanistan to a point where it can exercise control over the country?"
2. Significantly boost American commitment to train Afghan troops
According to Sanger, Bush pursued versions of this strategy, but the training always took longer and proved less successful than plans called for.
3. Devote full American and NATO resources to a large-scale counterinsurgency effort
At the very time the U.S. is seeking to expand its presence in Afghanistan, many NATO allies are scheduled too leave...

The Shanker piece, which was released 19 March, suggests that Obama is poised to select option 2. The plan recommends a goal of about 400,000 troops and national police officers, which is more than twice the forces' current size, and more than three times the size U.S. officials believed would be adequate in 2002. Additionally, cost projections for this plan range from $10 billion to $20 billion over the next six or seven years. By comparison, the entire Afghan government budget is $1.1 billion.

These are tough decisions Obama is facing. It's safe to bet that we are going to be hearing a lot more about Afghanistan in the coming months.

Also, see:
"Some Things Don’t Change: The Military Hammer"

The Beast of Burden?: USMC Rethinking Body Armor Requirements

I’ve been watching the past few months as the Marine Corps prepares to go into Afghanistan.  Comparisons to Iraq are natural, but anyone who practices the military profession realizes that there are some similarities, but the differences are significant.

One of the main differences is the terrain in Afghanistan, which is much harsher than in Iraq.  The infrastructure (road network) is far less developed and much of the geography is downright vicious.

When the Iraq war kicked off the Congressional war cry was for more armor for the troops – more body armor and hardened vehicles.  Unfortunately, the terrain in Afghanistan is unforgiving on heavy things – Marines wearing too much body armor and vehicles designed to mitigate roadside bombs.

Currently, a combat ready Marine can be required to carry up to 80 pounds or more of protective equipment and other gear (rifle, water, ammunition).  A protective vest alone weighs about 35 pounds.

The Marine Corps has looked at the requirements of Afghanistan and come to the conclusion that the current weight of protective gear a Marine carries is a liability in executing the mission AND protecting the Marine.

Marine Lt. Gen. George Flynn, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Combat Development and Integration, recently told Congress, “The bottom line is the focus on armor as the principal means of protecting our force is making us too heavy.”

In separate comments, Brig. Gen. Tim Hanifen, Deputy Commanding General of the Marine Combat Development Command, said, “Being able to maneuver and fight and chase down a fleeing enemy; that’s actually where your protection is (versus) armoring up and being more static.”

The political “hot potato” here is convincing a war-weary public that less-is-more.  Jean Malone, Deputy Director of Experiment Plans at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab said there could be backlash if a commander decides protective gear is not suited for a particular mission and a service member is killed.

To mitigate this problem, the Marines are testing and fielding a vest that weighs less than 20 pounds, and are looking for a lighter hardened vehicle solution.

Additionally, the Marines are educating Congress about their less-is-more philosophy in hopes of avoiding a public backlash.