Why Don't People Like Tom Friedman?

OPINION: "In the Age of Pirates," by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 15 April 2008; and "Another Friedman Special," by Hooman Majd, Huffington Post, 15 April 2009

This is not the great age of diplomacy.

But this is increasingly an age of pirates, failed states, nonstate actors and nation-building — the stuff of snipers, drones and generals, not diplomats.

As such, I fear we are sliding into commitments in Afghanistan and Pakistan without a real national debate about the ends or the means or the exits. That is a recipe for trouble.

Once again, Tom Friedman takes a complicated topic and makes it understandable for folks that don't work in the foreign policy or national security fields. In this case, Friedman posits that the U.S. has four big problem countries -- Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea -- and no good solutions, or solutions that require more than the U.S. is willing to invest. The Obama administrations solution is to do just enough to avoid collapse but not enough to solve problems, which is really no solution. This solution is essentially just kicking the can down the road with hope that time will solve the problem.

If instead the students at Friedman's school are taught that it's not about pulling levers or demanding things of foreigners, but about negotiating according to the culture and customs of both parties, of understanding that problems cannot be solved in this "flat world" without considering the vital interests of all parties, then we might have a shot. It's not, as Mr. Friedman fears, about adopting a "middle ground," it's about fundamental change, as Mr. Obama promised in his campaign and as he is slowly, but surely, delivering. Iran, for one, appears to be patiently waiting.

Hooman Majd makes some good points in his "rebuttal" of Friedman. However, I think he misses Friedman's main point: the unwillingness of the U.S. to make the appropriate investment to solve problems in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea. Ultimately, his rational argument is lost in the petty sniping and, borderline, professional jealousy he directs toward Friedman.

Holbrooke and Mullen's Af-Pak Trip

Diplomatic: “The Diplomatic Surge: Can Obama’s Team Tame the Taliban?,” by Joe Klein, Time.com, 9 April 2009; “A Short Fuse in Pakistan,” by David Ignatius, Washington Post, 10 April 2009; and “Holbrook of South Asia,” by Matthew Kaminski, Wall Street Journal, 11 April 2009

In a recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af-Pak), Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, President Obama’s special envoy to the region, and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took Obama’s new “regional” Af-Pak strategy to the people of both countries.

What Holbrooke and Mullen learned was not necessarily unique, but what was unique was who they learned it from. Instead of the usual round of private meetings with government officials, which were conducted, additional meetings with farmers, tribal leaders, women legislators, rule-of-law advocates, journalists, the local diplomatic corps, and religious leaders provided the two with the best insight into the complexities of the Af-Pak problem.

What they learned in Afghanistan

• U.S. military plan for developing other than opium crops is undermining a USAID plan to do the same thing
• U.S. Army National Guard farmer-soldier teams are having a positive impact in remote Afghan districts – helping to plant and protect crops
• Afghans believe the Taliban is being supported by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which is supported by American funding
• There is a growing comparison by the Afghan people of the U.S. military to the Russian military as a result of collateral deaths from air strikes and direct action raids

What they learned in Pakistan

• The Zardari government is unwilling to admit the extent of Pakistan’s terror problem
• U.S. Predator drone strikes are alienating the population
• U.S. should channel aid through the tribal chiefs, rather than the Pakistani government
• U.S. should train the Frontier Corps, rather than rely on the Pakistani army, who are seen as outsiders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
• To curb the militant Islamic madrassas, the U.S. should help improve public schools in the region

During the trip, Mullen repeated on multiple occasions, “We’ve developed the best counterinsurgency capability in the world.”

The key tenants of that counterinsurgency capability are to protect the public and build civil order. Exactly the types of things that would resolve the majority of the issues highlighted above.

Obama's Plan for Afghanistan

Afghanistan: "Obama Outlines Afghan Strategy," by Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, 28 March 2009

On 27 March, President Obama outlined his anxiously awaited new plan for dealing with the declining situation in Afghanistan. Obama made it clear that his primary objective is to create a country stable and strong enough to prevent al Qaeda from reoccupying Afghan territory.

That's a significantly scaled down approach from the Bush administration, which sought the lofty goal of creating a stable democracy in Afghanistan.

Not surprisingly, Pakistan is front-and-center in Obama's approach. In a speech outlining the Afghan strategy Obama said, "Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken -- one way or the other -- when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets."

Additionally, the strategy contains a regional approach. Obama said he plans to bring together "all who should have a stake in the region," including Iran, Russia, China, and India.

Keeping with the theme of narrowing the optic, within Afghanistan, Obama said he intends to focus on government incompetence, opium cultivation and heroin trafficking, and a poorly equipped and trained army.

A few thoughts:
-Narrowing the focus is obviously the correct approach at this stage in the game. A stable Afghanistan is a reasonable goal. Creating a flourishing democracy is much too broad.
-Zeroing in on Pakistan is one of the key factors in cutting off safe havens for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters attacking into Afghanistan.
-A regional approach sounds like a great idea, and makes for great PR, however, I'll be watching carefully to see if there is any traction in actually moving this lofty goal forward.
-Focusing on government incompetence within Afghanistan is going to be challenging. I've seen some reporting that suggests that the U.S. may move to support regional governance at the expense of the central government.
-Stemming opium cultivation and heroin trafficking is a no win situation because drug profits account for the overwhelming majority of GNP in Afghanistan.
-Building up poorly equipped and trained security forces is actually reasonable, and we have plenty of experience to draw from.

In the end, building up Afghanistan's security forces is the near-term Obama plan action item that is, realistically, likely to be achieved and pay the best return on investment.

Also, see:
"Measuring NATO Effectiveness in Afghanistan?"
"Pakastan's Nawaz Sharif: Friend or Foe?"
"Afghanistan Roundup"

Pakastan's Nawaz Sharif: Friend or Foe?

Pakistan: "U.S. Weighs Sharif As Partner In Pakistan," by Jim Perlez, New York Times, 25 March 2009

The big question Perlez poses in this article is: Can the U.S. trust Nawaz Sharif? Sharif is a former two-time prime minister (1990-1993 and 1997-1999) who:

1. Once pressed for Islamic law for Pakistan
2. Tested a nuclear bomb
3. Was accused of undemocratic behavior (whatever that means...)

These things would seem counter to what the U.S. would desire, but...

"Some diplomats and analysts argue...that Mr. Sharif’s affinity with the Islamic parties could now be an asset as Washington tries to win Pakistani support to fight the militants. 'We, and all sensible Pakistanis, need the support of Saudi Arabia and the more moderate Islamist parties, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, if we are ever going to tame the jihadis,' said a former American ambassador to Pakistan, Robert B. Oakley. 'Nawaz’s good standing with them is very, very important.'"

"Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, said Washington’s suspicions of Mr. Sharif might actually be helpful. 'He is sufficiently distanced from the United States to be a credible partner in the eyes of Pakistanis,' she said."

One thing is certain, the status quo is not working in Pakistan. The situation continues to deteriorate, and Pakistan has been identified as THE big contributing factor to the decline in the security situation in Afghanistan. I'm no Pakistan expert, but it would seem now is a good time to try something new.