Afghanistan: "Obama Outlines Afghan Strategy," by Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, 28 March 2009
On 27 March, President Obama outlined his anxiously awaited new plan for dealing with the declining situation in Afghanistan. Obama made it clear that his primary objective is to create a country stable and strong enough to prevent al Qaeda from reoccupying Afghan territory.
That's a significantly scaled down approach from the Bush administration, which sought the lofty goal of creating a stable democracy in Afghanistan.
Not surprisingly, Pakistan is front-and-center in Obama's approach. In a speech outlining the Afghan strategy Obama said, "Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken -- one way or the other -- when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets."
Additionally, the strategy contains a regional approach. Obama said he plans to bring together "all who should have a stake in the region," including Iran, Russia, China, and India.
Keeping with the theme of narrowing the optic, within Afghanistan, Obama said he intends to focus on government incompetence, opium cultivation and heroin trafficking, and a poorly equipped and trained army.
A few thoughts:
-Narrowing the focus is obviously the correct approach at this stage in the game. A stable Afghanistan is a reasonable goal. Creating a flourishing democracy is much too broad.
-Zeroing in on Pakistan is one of the key factors in cutting off safe havens for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters attacking into Afghanistan.
-A regional approach sounds like a great idea, and makes for great PR, however, I'll be watching carefully to see if there is any traction in actually moving this lofty goal forward.
-Focusing on government incompetence within Afghanistan is going to be challenging. I've seen some reporting that suggests that the U.S. may move to support regional governance at the expense of the central government.
-Stemming opium cultivation and heroin trafficking is a no win situation because drug profits account for the overwhelming majority of GNP in Afghanistan.
-Building up poorly equipped and trained security forces is actually reasonable, and we have plenty of experience to draw from.
In the end, building up Afghanistan's security forces is the near-term Obama plan action item that is, realistically, likely to be achieved and pay the best return on investment.
Also, see:
"Measuring NATO Effectiveness in Afghanistan?"
"Pakastan's Nawaz Sharif: Friend or Foe?"
"Afghanistan Roundup"
Showing posts with label al aqeda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label al aqeda. Show all posts
Sunday, March 29, 2009
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Afghanistan Roundup
Afghanistan: "U.S. Weighs Taliban Strike Into Pakistan," by David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 18 March 2009 and "Obama Seeks Vastly Expanded Afghan Security Force to Help Stabilize the Nation," by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 19 March 2009
A few quick thoughts on the these two articles. In the Sanger/Schmitt piece the authors look at two main issues: 1. Should the U.S. strike Taliban militants outside of the tribal areas of Pakistan; and 2. The options Obama has for going forward with Afghanistan.
On the first issue, Obama must decide if it's prudent to strike Taliban (and al Qaeda) militants outside the federally administered tribal areas, more specifically in the populated city of Quetta in the Baluchistan province (see map). With the continued lethal success of Predator strikes in the tribal areas, reporting is suggesting that Taliban militants are migrating into the Baluchistan province, which is under central government control.
Evidently, Gen Patraeus (Central Command) and LtGen Lute (NSC Directorate for Afghanistan and Iraq) have recommended widening the strikes into the Baluchistan province. They see an opportunity to exploit the success of strikes in the tribal areas, which have caused other militants to come out
of hiding and move. By moving, the militants are much more vulnerable to military action.
The key sticking point would be whether to risk further inflaming the Pakistani populace with an expansion of strikes into central government controlled territories. There is already significant heartburn with the strikes in the federally administrated tribal areas, which Pakistan says violates it sovereignty.
I would tend to agree with expanding the strikes. If you have the enemy on the run, and the Pakistan government won't, or can't, exploit this success, than the U.S. military should feel obliged to take every advantage necessary for success.
The second issue in the Sanger article deals with Obama's options for moving forward with Afghanistan. Sanger identifies three options available to Obama:
1. Scale back American ambitions and simply assure Afghanistan does not become a sanctuary for terrorists
According to a senior diplomat, "We are taking this [Afghanistan decision] back to the fundamental question: Can you ever get a central government in Afghanistan to a point where it can exercise control over the country?"
2. Significantly boost American commitment to train Afghan troops
According to Sanger, Bush pursued versions of this strategy, but the training always took longer and proved less successful than plans called for.
3. Devote full American and NATO resources to a large-scale counterinsurgency effort
At the very time the U.S. is seeking to expand its presence in Afghanistan, many NATO allies are scheduled too leave...
The Shanker piece, which was released 19 March, suggests that Obama is poised to select option 2. The plan recommends a goal of about 400,000 troops and national police officers, which is more than twice the forces' current size, and more than three times the size U.S. officials believed would be adequate in 2002. Additionally, cost projections for this plan range from $10 billion to $20 billion over the next six or seven years. By comparison, the entire Afghan government budget is $1.1 billion.
These are tough decisions Obama is facing. It's safe to bet that we are going to be hearing a lot more about Afghanistan in the coming months.
Also, see:
"Some Things Don’t Change: The Military Hammer"
A few quick thoughts on the these two articles. In the Sanger/Schmitt piece the authors look at two main issues: 1. Should the U.S. strike Taliban militants outside of the tribal areas of Pakistan; and 2. The options Obama has for going forward with Afghanistan.
On the first issue, Obama must decide if it's prudent to strike Taliban (and al Qaeda) militants outside the federally administered tribal areas, more specifically in the populated city of Quetta in the Baluchistan province (see map). With the continued lethal success of Predator strikes in the tribal areas, reporting is suggesting that Taliban militants are migrating into the Baluchistan province, which is under central government control.
Evidently, Gen Patraeus (Central Command) and LtGen Lute (NSC Directorate for Afghanistan and Iraq) have recommended widening the strikes into the Baluchistan province. They see an opportunity to exploit the success of strikes in the tribal areas, which have caused other militants to come out
of hiding and move. By moving, the militants are much more vulnerable to military action.The key sticking point would be whether to risk further inflaming the Pakistani populace with an expansion of strikes into central government controlled territories. There is already significant heartburn with the strikes in the federally administrated tribal areas, which Pakistan says violates it sovereignty.
I would tend to agree with expanding the strikes. If you have the enemy on the run, and the Pakistan government won't, or can't, exploit this success, than the U.S. military should feel obliged to take every advantage necessary for success.
The second issue in the Sanger article deals with Obama's options for moving forward with Afghanistan. Sanger identifies three options available to Obama:
1. Scale back American ambitions and simply assure Afghanistan does not become a sanctuary for terrorists
According to a senior diplomat, "We are taking this [Afghanistan decision] back to the fundamental question: Can you ever get a central government in Afghanistan to a point where it can exercise control over the country?"
2. Significantly boost American commitment to train Afghan troops
According to Sanger, Bush pursued versions of this strategy, but the training always took longer and proved less successful than plans called for.
3. Devote full American and NATO resources to a large-scale counterinsurgency effort
At the very time the U.S. is seeking to expand its presence in Afghanistan, many NATO allies are scheduled too leave...
The Shanker piece, which was released 19 March, suggests that Obama is poised to select option 2. The plan recommends a goal of about 400,000 troops and national police officers, which is more than twice the forces' current size, and more than three times the size U.S. officials believed would be adequate in 2002. Additionally, cost projections for this plan range from $10 billion to $20 billion over the next six or seven years. By comparison, the entire Afghan government budget is $1.1 billion.
These are tough decisions Obama is facing. It's safe to bet that we are going to be hearing a lot more about Afghanistan in the coming months.
Also, see:
"Some Things Don’t Change: The Military Hammer"
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