The Strategic Corporal

OPINION: “Leadership, Petraeus Style,” by Paula D. Broadwell, Boston Globe, 21 April 2009

In Petraeus’s words, ”we must continually think about the relatively junior officer who has to make a huge decision, often with life or death consequences, in the blink of an eye. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptive leaders. The key to all that we did in Iraq was leaders – especially young leaders – who repeatedly rose to the occasion and took on tasks for which they’d had little or no training.”

For folks in the military, junior officers or junior enlisted men making decisions is not a new idea. The principle of pushing responsibility down to the lowest level for decision is a staple of military training -- empower subordinates to make decisions in the absence of direct supervision.

To exercise this principle effectively the military uses a couple of concepts, which when taken together, allow for timely decisions.

The first concept is mission-type tactics. Mission-type tactics is nothing more than a commander giving a subordinate a goal (mission), the resources and time to accomplish the goal, and letting the subordinate figure out how to make it happen.

The second concept is commander’s intent. In a nutshell, commander’s intent is how the commander envisions his battlespace at the completion of his mission -- his end state. The commander communicates this to subordinates so, in the absence of any guidance, they have the ability to continue to make timely decisions with a broad understanding of what the “boss” would have them do given particular circumstances.

Mission-type tactics and commander's intent allow for quick and timely decisions. A good decision executed in a timely manner is better than a perfect decision executed too late. This philosophy has proven correct time and again, with no better examples than the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In both conflicts, U.S. servicemembers, usually aged between 18 and 24, are making the split-second life and death decisions referred to above by General David Patraeus. Compound this with the twenty-four hour news cycle and instant global communications, and the decisions are truly strategic in nature.

Because of the strategic nature of the decisions these young American patriots are forced to make, they are often referred to as "strategic corporals."

Afghanistan Roundup

Afghanistan: "U.S. Weighs Taliban Strike Into Pakistan," by David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 18 March 2009 and "Obama Seeks Vastly Expanded Afghan Security Force to Help Stabilize the Nation," by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 19 March 2009

A few quick thoughts on the these two articles. In the Sanger/Schmitt piece the authors look at two main issues: 1. Should the U.S. strike Taliban militants outside of the tribal areas of Pakistan; and 2. The options Obama has for going forward with Afghanistan.

On the first issue, Obama must decide if it's prudent to strike Taliban (and al Qaeda) militants outside the federally administered tribal areas, more specifically in the populated city of Quetta in the Baluchistan province (see map). With the continued lethal success of Predator strikes in the tribal areas, reporting is suggesting that Taliban militants are migrating into the Baluchistan province, which is under central government control.

Evidently, Gen Patraeus (Central Command) and LtGen Lute (NSC Directorate for Afghanistan and Iraq) have recommended widening the strikes into the Baluchistan province. They see an opportunity to exploit the success of strikes in the tribal areas, which have caused other militants to come out of hiding and move. By moving, the militants are much more vulnerable to military action.

The key sticking point would be whether to risk further inflaming the Pakistani populace with an expansion of strikes into central government controlled territories. There is already significant heartburn with the strikes in the federally administrated tribal areas, which Pakistan says violates it sovereignty.

I would tend to agree with expanding the strikes. If you have the enemy on the run, and the Pakistan government won't, or can't, exploit this success, than the U.S. military should feel obliged to take every advantage necessary for success.

The second issue in the Sanger article deals with Obama's options for moving forward with Afghanistan. Sanger identifies three options available to Obama:

1. Scale back American ambitions and simply assure Afghanistan does not become a sanctuary for terrorists
According to a senior diplomat, "We are taking this [Afghanistan decision] back to the fundamental question: Can you ever get a central government in Afghanistan to a point where it can exercise control over the country?"
2. Significantly boost American commitment to train Afghan troops
According to Sanger, Bush pursued versions of this strategy, but the training always took longer and proved less successful than plans called for.
3. Devote full American and NATO resources to a large-scale counterinsurgency effort
At the very time the U.S. is seeking to expand its presence in Afghanistan, many NATO allies are scheduled too leave...

The Shanker piece, which was released 19 March, suggests that Obama is poised to select option 2. The plan recommends a goal of about 400,000 troops and national police officers, which is more than twice the forces' current size, and more than three times the size U.S. officials believed would be adequate in 2002. Additionally, cost projections for this plan range from $10 billion to $20 billion over the next six or seven years. By comparison, the entire Afghan government budget is $1.1 billion.

These are tough decisions Obama is facing. It's safe to bet that we are going to be hearing a lot more about Afghanistan in the coming months.

Also, see:
"Some Things Don’t Change: The Military Hammer"