A few quick thoughts on the these two articles. In the Sanger/Schmitt piece the authors look at two main issues: 1. Should the U.S. strike Taliban militants outside of the tribal areas of Pakistan; and 2. The options Obama has for going forward with Afghanistan.
On the first issue, Obama must decide if it's prudent to strike Taliban (and al Qaeda) militants outside the federally administered tribal areas, more specifically in the populated city of Quetta in the Baluchistan province (see map). With the continued lethal success of Predator strikes in the tribal areas, reporting is suggesting that Taliban militants are migrating into the Baluchistan province, which is under central government control.
Evidently, Gen Patraeus (Central Command) and LtGen Lute (NSC Directorate for Afghanistan and Iraq) have recommended widening the strikes into the Baluchistan province. They see an opportunity to exploit the success of strikes in the tribal areas, which have caused other militants to come out
of hiding and move. By moving, the militants are much more vulnerable to military action.The key sticking point would be whether to risk further inflaming the Pakistani populace with an expansion of strikes into central government controlled territories. There is already significant heartburn with the strikes in the federally administrated tribal areas, which Pakistan says violates it sovereignty.
I would tend to agree with expanding the strikes. If you have the enemy on the run, and the Pakistan government won't, or can't, exploit this success, than the U.S. military should feel obliged to take every advantage necessary for success.
The second issue in the Sanger article deals with Obama's options for moving forward with Afghanistan. Sanger identifies three options available to Obama:
1. Scale back American ambitions and simply assure Afghanistan does not become a sanctuary for terrorists
According to a senior diplomat, "We are taking this [Afghanistan decision] back to the fundamental question: Can you ever get a central government in Afghanistan to a point where it can exercise control over the country?"
2. Significantly boost American commitment to train Afghan troops
According to Sanger, Bush pursued versions of this strategy, but the training always took longer and proved less successful than plans called for.
3. Devote full American and NATO resources to a large-scale counterinsurgency effort
At the very time the U.S. is seeking to expand its presence in Afghanistan, many NATO allies are scheduled too leave...
The Shanker piece, which was released 19 March, suggests that Obama is poised to select option 2. The plan recommends a goal of about 400,000 troops and national police officers, which is more than twice the forces' current size, and more than three times the size U.S. officials believed would be adequate in 2002. Additionally, cost projections for this plan range from $10 billion to $20 billion over the next six or seven years. By comparison, the entire Afghan government budget is $1.1 billion.
These are tough decisions Obama is facing. It's safe to bet that we are going to be hearing a lot more about Afghanistan in the coming months.
Also, see:
"Some Things Don’t Change: The Military Hammer"
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