Obama's Plan for Afghanistan

Afghanistan: "Obama Outlines Afghan Strategy," by Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, 28 March 2009

On 27 March, President Obama outlined his anxiously awaited new plan for dealing with the declining situation in Afghanistan. Obama made it clear that his primary objective is to create a country stable and strong enough to prevent al Qaeda from reoccupying Afghan territory.

That's a significantly scaled down approach from the Bush administration, which sought the lofty goal of creating a stable democracy in Afghanistan.

Not surprisingly, Pakistan is front-and-center in Obama's approach. In a speech outlining the Afghan strategy Obama said, "Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken -- one way or the other -- when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets."

Additionally, the strategy contains a regional approach. Obama said he plans to bring together "all who should have a stake in the region," including Iran, Russia, China, and India.

Keeping with the theme of narrowing the optic, within Afghanistan, Obama said he intends to focus on government incompetence, opium cultivation and heroin trafficking, and a poorly equipped and trained army.

A few thoughts:
-Narrowing the focus is obviously the correct approach at this stage in the game. A stable Afghanistan is a reasonable goal. Creating a flourishing democracy is much too broad.
-Zeroing in on Pakistan is one of the key factors in cutting off safe havens for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters attacking into Afghanistan.
-A regional approach sounds like a great idea, and makes for great PR, however, I'll be watching carefully to see if there is any traction in actually moving this lofty goal forward.
-Focusing on government incompetence within Afghanistan is going to be challenging. I've seen some reporting that suggests that the U.S. may move to support regional governance at the expense of the central government.
-Stemming opium cultivation and heroin trafficking is a no win situation because drug profits account for the overwhelming majority of GNP in Afghanistan.
-Building up poorly equipped and trained security forces is actually reasonable, and we have plenty of experience to draw from.

In the end, building up Afghanistan's security forces is the near-term Obama plan action item that is, realistically, likely to be achieved and pay the best return on investment.

Also, see:
"Measuring NATO Effectiveness in Afghanistan?"
"Pakastan's Nawaz Sharif: Friend or Foe?"
"Afghanistan Roundup"

Measuring NATO Effectiveness in Afghanistan?

Afghanistan: “NATO Can’t Measure Afghan War Performance: General,” by Andrew Gray, Reuters, 24 March 2009

How does NATO measure the effectiveness of operations in Afghanistan? Apparently, they don’t – according to NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen John Craddock.

NATO has no reliable way to assess its performance in the war in Afghanistan even as the United States prepares to announce the results of an Afghan strategy review, the alliance's top commander said on Tuesday.

Craddock said his headquarters had tried to find ways to measure factors, such as security and the effectiveness of Afghan authorities, but the task had proven "overwhelming".

"Right now, our assessments of progress are anecdotal and they vary daily, weekly, with whoever makes the observation and where they are making them," Craddock told a hearing of the Senate's armed services committee.

The above statements are very telling of the difficulties that lie ahead for U.S. troops “surging” into Afghanistan.

Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are military parlance for tracking how a campaign is progressing. The military campaign is usually broken into phases, and MOEs allow the commander to decide when a campaign has transitioned from one phase to the next. Each phase usually has certain metrics that, when met, signal success and transition.

It’s quite telling when the overall commander of NATO forces tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that he has no way of measuring how his campaign is progressing – no way of verifying the impact his forces are having on the country.

Hmm… What does that signal? We’ve been operating in Afghanistan for eight years now, and still don’t know how to quantify the definition of success there.

Pakastan's Nawaz Sharif: Friend or Foe?

Pakistan: "U.S. Weighs Sharif As Partner In Pakistan," by Jim Perlez, New York Times, 25 March 2009

The big question Perlez poses in this article is: Can the U.S. trust Nawaz Sharif? Sharif is a former two-time prime minister (1990-1993 and 1997-1999) who:

1. Once pressed for Islamic law for Pakistan
2. Tested a nuclear bomb
3. Was accused of undemocratic behavior (whatever that means...)

These things would seem counter to what the U.S. would desire, but...

"Some diplomats and analysts argue...that Mr. Sharif’s affinity with the Islamic parties could now be an asset as Washington tries to win Pakistani support to fight the militants. 'We, and all sensible Pakistanis, need the support of Saudi Arabia and the more moderate Islamist parties, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, if we are ever going to tame the jihadis,' said a former American ambassador to Pakistan, Robert B. Oakley. 'Nawaz’s good standing with them is very, very important.'"

"Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, said Washington’s suspicions of Mr. Sharif might actually be helpful. 'He is sufficiently distanced from the United States to be a credible partner in the eyes of Pakistanis,' she said."

One thing is certain, the status quo is not working in Pakistan. The situation continues to deteriorate, and Pakistan has been identified as THE big contributing factor to the decline in the security situation in Afghanistan. I'm no Pakistan expert, but it would seem now is a good time to try something new.

Afghanistan Roundup

Afghanistan: "U.S. Weighs Taliban Strike Into Pakistan," by David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 18 March 2009 and "Obama Seeks Vastly Expanded Afghan Security Force to Help Stabilize the Nation," by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 19 March 2009

A few quick thoughts on the these two articles. In the Sanger/Schmitt piece the authors look at two main issues: 1. Should the U.S. strike Taliban militants outside of the tribal areas of Pakistan; and 2. The options Obama has for going forward with Afghanistan.

On the first issue, Obama must decide if it's prudent to strike Taliban (and al Qaeda) militants outside the federally administered tribal areas, more specifically in the populated city of Quetta in the Baluchistan province (see map). With the continued lethal success of Predator strikes in the tribal areas, reporting is suggesting that Taliban militants are migrating into the Baluchistan province, which is under central government control.

Evidently, Gen Patraeus (Central Command) and LtGen Lute (NSC Directorate for Afghanistan and Iraq) have recommended widening the strikes into the Baluchistan province. They see an opportunity to exploit the success of strikes in the tribal areas, which have caused other militants to come out of hiding and move. By moving, the militants are much more vulnerable to military action.

The key sticking point would be whether to risk further inflaming the Pakistani populace with an expansion of strikes into central government controlled territories. There is already significant heartburn with the strikes in the federally administrated tribal areas, which Pakistan says violates it sovereignty.

I would tend to agree with expanding the strikes. If you have the enemy on the run, and the Pakistan government won't, or can't, exploit this success, than the U.S. military should feel obliged to take every advantage necessary for success.

The second issue in the Sanger article deals with Obama's options for moving forward with Afghanistan. Sanger identifies three options available to Obama:

1. Scale back American ambitions and simply assure Afghanistan does not become a sanctuary for terrorists
According to a senior diplomat, "We are taking this [Afghanistan decision] back to the fundamental question: Can you ever get a central government in Afghanistan to a point where it can exercise control over the country?"
2. Significantly boost American commitment to train Afghan troops
According to Sanger, Bush pursued versions of this strategy, but the training always took longer and proved less successful than plans called for.
3. Devote full American and NATO resources to a large-scale counterinsurgency effort
At the very time the U.S. is seeking to expand its presence in Afghanistan, many NATO allies are scheduled too leave...

The Shanker piece, which was released 19 March, suggests that Obama is poised to select option 2. The plan recommends a goal of about 400,000 troops and national police officers, which is more than twice the forces' current size, and more than three times the size U.S. officials believed would be adequate in 2002. Additionally, cost projections for this plan range from $10 billion to $20 billion over the next six or seven years. By comparison, the entire Afghan government budget is $1.1 billion.

These are tough decisions Obama is facing. It's safe to bet that we are going to be hearing a lot more about Afghanistan in the coming months.

Also, see:
"Some Things Don’t Change: The Military Hammer"

Gates the Pragmatist

Defense: "Gates Plays Down Russia, China Threats," by David Morgan, Reuters, 18 March 2009

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates never ceases to amaze me with his pragmatic approach to being the defense chief. I have always thought this, but reading the above short Reuters piece just drove the point home. Since taking over the SecDef position in 2006 he is widely credited with salvaging a flawed battle plan for Iraq. With the ship somewhat righted in Iraq, it appears his focus is turning to more of a traditional defense chief role: Exerting control over the sprawling bureaucracy that is the DoD.

Granted, there are still significant challenges in Iraq, and tremendous challenges upcoming in Afghanistan, but Gates seems to be prepping for a monumental battle with defense contractors. For the past several months he's been preaching the need to prepare for the battles we are fighting today, which he seems to think will be the long term battles as well.

In this article he continues this theme by addressing the supposed China threat, and a resurgent Russia. Read some of his thoughts below:

"A day after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that Russia would rearm its military and boost its nuclear forces, the U.S. defense chief said Moscow is actually moving to reduce the size of its traditional military force."

"As I read between the lines, the first message that he was giving to the Russian military was: 'Don't expect any new equipment for two years."

"Gates told reporters at a Pentagon briefing he also does not believe aggressive Chinese behavior against U.S. Navy surveillance vessels in the South China Sea suggests Beijing wants to force the U.S. Pacific fleet from the region."

To me, Gates' rationale on China and Russia makes sense. However, folks that have "near peer" weapons systems potentially on the chopping block are not going to agree that Gates is being very pragmatic.

More Government 2.0 Musings

Government 2.0: "Military Blocks Its Own 'YouTube' Knockoff (Updated Again)," by Noah Shachtman, Wired , 17 March 2009; and "Government 2.0 Meets Catch 22," Saul Hansell, New York Times, 17 March 2009

These two articles sum up nicely what I have been lamenting for a while. In the Wired article Shachtman writes that some military units have blocked a website called TroopTube, which was created by the DoD. Incidently, TroopTube was created becasue the DoD banned YouTube!

An Air Force civilain told Wireds' Danger Room, "You know, it's bad enough they don't trust us with the 'real' internet and social media sites. Why don't they they trust us with the sites they invent?"

Shachctman also details the difficulty the military has had in controlling use and access to social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter.

"The military has struggled, since social media began, to figure out how exactly troops should be allowed to participate -- if at all. Network administrators at Air Force bases already put strict limitations on what sites their troops can and cannot visit. Many airmen can't access Danger Room, for example — or any site with the word "blog" in the URL. Army secrecy regulations, read literally, make it next-to-impossible for average soldiers to blog. Yet leading generals, deployed to war zones, are keeping online journals. The Pentagon employs an in-house video blogger. And the Department of Defense press office is making a concerted push to reach out to bloggers and non-traditional media."

The Hansell New York Times article discusses some of these same problems, but from the perspective of other non-DoD government agencies.

"Organizations of all sorts have been trying to figure out how they can adapt social networks, blogs, wiki’s and other Web tools to their traditional operating methods in order to connect to customers and partners."

"But it is tough. “We have a Facebook page,” said one official of the Department of Homeland Security. “But we don’t allow people to look at Facebook in the office. So we have to go home to use it. I find this bizarre.”"

Come on guys! There are a ton of smart people in the government, can't we figure out how to make this stuff accessible!?

For other postings from me on this subject see the below:
The DoD: Lumbering Through the IT Revolution
Cyber Attacks on Government Networks and Web 2.0

The "Golden Hour"

Military: "Airborne surgical team headed to Afghanistan," by Nancy Montgomery, Mideast Stars and Stripes, 14 March 2009

This article made me take pause and reflect on the amazing capabilities of modern medicine, and how it has shaped military planning and operations. The "golden hour," or the first hour after a servicemember is wounded, is critical. If a servicemember can survive an initial catastrophic battlefield injury, and subsequent medical evacuation, they have over a 90 percent survival rate. I find that amazing when you consider the lethality of modern warfare, and compare it to the survival rates in other wars (World War II 70%, Korea 75%, and Vietnam 76%).

The golden hour has become so important that it is a reality in military planning. In some cases commanders will think twice about a mission if they can't get troops critical care within the golden hour. Now, don't get me wrong, in most cases, the golden hour is not going to dictate "go" or "no go" criteria for operations. But, it will certainly be factored into the risk assessments that commanders make when considering an operation.

Kundra's Ignominious Introduction

I was encouraged by comments newly appointed Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Vivek Kundra made in a 12 March address at the FOSE trade show in Washington, D.C.  I only hope he has the mandate and wherewithal to execute the plans he has laid out since his 5 March appointment.

An interesting aside is that I was able to follow Kundra’s speech on Twitter as attendees (@cheeky_geeky, @acarvin, @Shawn_McCarthy and others) live-tweeted his remarks.

Kundra comes to the Federal CIO position from the D.C. Chief Technology Officer position.  By all accounts, at least from a sampling of tweets and blog postings, Kundra is a good selection for the federal CIO position.  His “street credibility” is descent; having championed the use of technology for increasing government transparency, engagement of citizens and lowering the cost of operations.

Not surprisingly, since his appointment, Kundra has said the above three technology issues, along with a fourth, fostering innovation, will constitute the four pillars of his technology agenda.

During the address to FOSE, Kundra expanded on these four priorities.  Some of the highlights from his address are below:

“The government can and has led,” he said, citing examples such as the creation of the Internet and the Human Genome Project. “We have to embrace a new self-image. … We can be thought leaders, especially in these trying economic times.”

“Technology enables the processes of government but we have to make sure that the processes are focused on the citizens.”

“Some of the smartest people I know are federal employees,” he said.  But too many of them have been told to not take risks and to not act on their ideas. They need to be “liberated,” he said.

Truth be told, my day job is not specifically technology related, I’m just a dumb Marine.  However, I believe technology needs to be embraced by the government at all levels.  I’m interested in the way forward because I believe if the government does not embrace technology, and we keep putting up walls and making excuses for using new technology, we will atrophy to a point of no return.  We have to stop making excuses and start using the collective knowledge of the smart people in the government to find solutions for implementing technology tools.

Having said all of the above, it’s ironic that as Kundra was speaking the FBI was raiding his office.  Reports suggest that he was not the target of the raid, but...  Other reports have suggested that Kundra has taken leave as a result of the raid.  An ignominious beginning for a much anticipated appointment…

The Beast of Burden?: USMC Rethinking Body Armor Requirements

I’ve been watching the past few months as the Marine Corps prepares to go into Afghanistan.  Comparisons to Iraq are natural, but anyone who practices the military profession realizes that there are some similarities, but the differences are significant.

One of the main differences is the terrain in Afghanistan, which is much harsher than in Iraq.  The infrastructure (road network) is far less developed and much of the geography is downright vicious.

When the Iraq war kicked off the Congressional war cry was for more armor for the troops – more body armor and hardened vehicles.  Unfortunately, the terrain in Afghanistan is unforgiving on heavy things – Marines wearing too much body armor and vehicles designed to mitigate roadside bombs.

Currently, a combat ready Marine can be required to carry up to 80 pounds or more of protective equipment and other gear (rifle, water, ammunition).  A protective vest alone weighs about 35 pounds.

The Marine Corps has looked at the requirements of Afghanistan and come to the conclusion that the current weight of protective gear a Marine carries is a liability in executing the mission AND protecting the Marine.

Marine Lt. Gen. George Flynn, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Combat Development and Integration, recently told Congress, “The bottom line is the focus on armor as the principal means of protecting our force is making us too heavy.”

In separate comments, Brig. Gen. Tim Hanifen, Deputy Commanding General of the Marine Combat Development Command, said, “Being able to maneuver and fight and chase down a fleeing enemy; that’s actually where your protection is (versus) armoring up and being more static.”

The political “hot potato” here is convincing a war-weary public that less-is-more.  Jean Malone, Deputy Director of Experiment Plans at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab said there could be backlash if a commander decides protective gear is not suited for a particular mission and a service member is killed.

To mitigate this problem, the Marines are testing and fielding a vest that weighs less than 20 pounds, and are looking for a lighter hardened vehicle solution.

Additionally, the Marines are educating Congress about their less-is-more philosophy in hopes of avoiding a public backlash.

Google Earth: A National Security Risk?

FOXNews posted a report today titled, "Google Earth Uncovers British Nuclear Sub Base, Missile Facility." The above picture tells the story. Is this a risk to national security? If so, how do you control/regulate Google Earth so sensitive imagery is not accessible to "Joe Public," or "Joe Terrorist?"

Welcome to the White House, Mr. Obama...

I found the 7 March Telegraph article, “Barack Obama ‘too tired’ to give proper welcome to Gordon Brown,” somewhat alarming.  Below are a few quotes from the article that peaked my interest with some commentary…

“They [British officials] concede that Obama aides seemed unfamiliar with the expectations that surround a major visit by a British prime minister.”

This smacks of U.S. incompetence.  How can “aides” be unfamiliar with the protocols for a foreign head of state visit, especially one of our closest allies?  There are people, apolitical government employees, who work at the White House, along with State Department folks, who do this stuff for a living.  This is just lack of attention to detail.

“But Washington figures with access to Mr. Obama's inner circle explained the slight by saying that those high up in the administration have had little time to deal with international matters, let alone the diplomatic niceties of the special relationship.”

“Little time to deal with international matters…”?  Isn’t the economic crisis an international matter? 

“Allies of Mr. Obama say his weary appearance in the Oval Office with Mr. Brown illustrates the strain he is now under, and the president's surprise at the sheer volume of business that crosses his desk.”

Rom Emanual better get this under control – this is a marathon, not a sprint.

“A well-connected Washington figure, who is close to members of Mr. Obama's inner circle, expressed concern that Mr. Obama had failed so far to ‘even fake an interest in foreign policy.’”

This will change as time passes.  Once again, isn’t the economic crisis an exercise in foreign policy?

“The American source said: "Obama is overwhelmed. There is a zero sum tension between his ability to attend to the economic issues and his ability to be a proactive sculptor of the national security agenda.”

Jim Jones and the national security team can help here by boldly setting the national security agenda for Obama.  Emanual can assist by making sure Obama’s daily schedule is structured and includes aspects of domestic policy, foreign policy, and the intersection of the two.

“But they [British diplomats] concede that the mood music of the event was at times strained. Mr. Brown handed over carefully selected gifts, including a pen holder made from the wood of a warship that helped stamp out the slave trade - a sister ship of the vessel from which timbers were taken to build Mr. Obama's Oval Office desk. Mr. Obama's gift in return, a collection of Hollywood film DVDs that could have been bought from any high street store, looked like the kind of thing the White House might hand out to the visiting head of a minor African state.”

This is just embarrassing…

Gordon Brown’s unfortunate visit is not Obama’s fault.  The fault here lies with his staff.  If the information in the article is true, Obama’s closest advisers need to quickly come up to speed on how to keep their boss focused on the “closest alligator to the canoe.”  It appears that Obama is getting into the “weeds” and getting bogged down.  We need our president to provide a strategic vision and stay above the fray.

Twitter Likes and Dislikes

I've recently started using Twitter. Below are a few things I have come to like, and dislike, about it.

Likes:
-Simplicity (See AB's Rules for Technology) -- Not a steep learning curve to get started...you follow and are followed and develop your Twitterverse.
-140 Characters - What a beautiful concept. Effectively keeps all the "windbags" in the personal blog realm.
-Access to Information - I'm an information junkie so I use Twitter to connect socially, feed my information addiction, and hopefully pass on my knowledge to others.
-Smart Twitterverse - People who Tweet, when taken collectively, appear to Tweet for professional reasons -- the social aspect is a secondary outcome. However, I suspect as Twitter continues to move toward mainstream, this is going to change -- the MySpace crowd is going to move in. Side note: That actually might be an interesting online demographic study...as the MySpace crowd moves to Twitter, where is the Facebook equivelent of Twitter...?

Dislikes:
-Relentless self promotion by what I call the "Twitterati" - It's like one large infomercial - except with six million inputs. Not everyone abuses the network, but it only takes one gonzo marketer to spoil a good feed.
-Information Overload - I have not figured out a good way to manage Tweet overload. I use a laptop and iPhone to keep up, but it can get overwhelming.
-Twitter Cults - I think there are Twitter cults forming (see Twitterati above) -- threatening to disrupt the community feel of the network. Everyone, me included, seems to follow the same folks that have bazillions of followers. I hope it doesn't turn in to a David Koresh or Jim Jones scenario...

These are a few positive and negative observations I have made in the short time I have been Tweeting. What are your thoughts?

-- Post From My iPhone

The DoD: Lumbering Through the IT Revolution

Recent comments made by Joint Chiefs Vice Chairmen General James Cartwright regarding the DoD IT procurement process highlight problems that the tactical warfighter has been lamenting for some time: it takes too long, and there are too many obstacles, for IT solutions to be implemented within the current DoD procurement structure.

Modern communications technologies develop faster than we can comprehend, and we don’t know where or when the next Twitter or Facebook will pop up.  However, with the current state of affairs, the DoD will never know because folks that work within the DoD networks don’t have access to the majority of these applications, or by the time they get access they are obsolete.

Cartwright commented that, “It’s not technology.  This is culture.  This is the imperative to change and be convinced that the imperative is real and will advantage us.”  Given Cartwright’s position, the target of his comments was most likely the strategic procurement thinker.

However, those comments ring true at the tactical level as well.  When a warfighter uses Web 2.0 tools to “move, shoot, and communicate,” but has to work around the network to utilize those tools, we have a problem.

Because many popular Web 2.0 tools are blocked from DoD networks, we effectively quash the creative ability of the warfighter to find unique solutions to the difficult problem of waging modern warfare.

Those that would do us harm use Web 2.0 tools against us.  Denying the warfighter access to these tools because of “security” risks, or a lumbering Cold War era procurement process, is not the solution.

The solution is to open the network and allow the collective brain power of the force to work through the difficult challenge of utilizing these powerful tools, but tailoring them for the, sometimes, sensitive nature of DoD work.

Also check out:
Cyber Attacks on Government Networks and Web 2.0
Thinking About Gov 2.0

Web Tools for Staying Productive and Organized

I am an admitted web tool junkie. Put out a new wizbang tool and I'm all over it. However, there is a method to my madness when it comes to web tools. Before going crazy with a new tool, I must see the practicality of it. How will it make me more productive and organized?

Below is a list of tools I am using to make myself more productive and organized:

1. Gmail - I made a gradual shift from Hotmail to Gmail a couple of years back. This was difficult for me because I have had the same Hotmail account for ten years. Gmail is such a superior product, and the folks at Google continue to improve it.

2. Google Reader - Google Reader is the base for all of my daily read material. I am a voracious consumer of information ranging from national security issues, to pop culture, to fantasy football and reader makes it possible. I spend a lot of time fine tuning (adding and subtracting) my RSS feeds to maintain a fresh flow of relative and timely information.

3. Google Calendar - A great tool to keep your life organized, and keep you on time.

4. Google Documents - Google Documents has just about supplanted the Microsoft Office suite for my word processing, spreadsheet, and presentation requirements.

--The beauty of ALL the Google tools is their ability to synch with my iPhone.

5. Toodledo - My electronic brain. I'm a big list maker and Toodledo is my list maker of choice, and it has a great iPhone application.

6. Twitter - I just started using Twitter recently, so I'm still learning the Twitter ropes. I am using Twitter to connect socially, keep track of my thoughts, learn from others, and share my knowledge. Twitter has multiple iPhone applications.

7. Facebook - I use Facebook to communicate with old friends and make new friends. Facebook has an iPhone application.

8. Blogger - Much like Twitter, I use Blogger to keep track of my thoughts and exercise my brain.

9. Evernote - I am still learning the power of Evernote as an organizational tool, but I can see its power. Evernote also has an iPhone application.

10. delicious - delicious is a great tool for keeping track of your bookmarks if you are jumping from computer to computer.

These tools are but a few that I have found supremely useful. What do you use to stay productive and organized?

Making the Foreign Service Better

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been calling for more resources for the State Department since he took over as defense chief in 2006.  Gates understands that the military instrument of national power has limitations.  A recent opinion piece in the Washington Times written by E. Wayne Merry titled, Foreign Service Leadership Gap?, highlights an area that may help resolve some of the State Departments resource problems.

In his opinion piece Merry zeroes in on the leadership, or lack there of, within the State Department.  He argues that the State Department Director General position should be elevated to a level commensurate with that of a military service chief, and that the position should be given similar responsibilities.  The military service chief is responsible for how their service will perform in 10 to 20 years’ time and assures that it receives the personnel resources, technology, and political support it requires.

Merry argues that the State Department promotes diplomatic rather than leadership skills and this would seem to be where the shortfall lies.  An organization is only as good as its people AND the quality of the leadership provided those people.  In my experience, the State Department has excellent people -- true patriots trying to serve our great country.  However, being a good diplomat does not necessarily mean being a good leader.

Great people all trying to do great things does not lend itself to greatness unless a singular leader is empowered to make strategic decisions for the future of an organization – decisions on funding, manning, training, and equipping that organization for success.  Obviously, the Secretary of State is not a good choice to get into the nuts and bolts of running the State Department.  Merry’s suggestion of empowering the Director General makes sense.

John Bolton: The Last of the Famous International Neocons

The title is a play on an old Morrissey song, The Last of the Famous International Playboys. Since John Bolton is not an international playboy, I figured neocon would be appropriate. Since leaving his post as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Bolton has written a memoir, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad, and an ongoing string of fire and brimstone pieces for the Wall Street Journal regarding the foreign policy mistakes he feels the U.S. is making.

What makes Bolton's rantings so interesting is the fact that they started when the Bush administration was still in office -- an administration that is arguably one of the most conservative in decades. Bolton thinks the former president became distracted with Iraq and was influenced by "pragmatists;" becoming soft in dealings with North Korea and Iran, and losing site of the Middle East peace process.

Bolton has emerged as the keeper of the neocon flame -- hence, The Last of the Famous International Neocons. With Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Dick Cheney off center stage, Bolton has continued to push neocon unilateralist views -- opposition to treaties and international institutions ranging from the Kyoto climate convention to the International Court of Criminal Justice, along with opposition to negotiations with North Korea and Iran over their nuclear programs.

With the Obama administration making overt invitations to Syria and Iran for direct negotiations, you can bet Bolton will continue to push the neocon unilateral agenda, or just yell at himself now that he doesn't have a staff to push around.

Obama's National Security Structure

Prioritizing and orchestrating the decision making process for the nations most pressing national security issues is a daunting, and often misunderstood process.  It is a fine balance between “fighting fires” and truly getting ahead of national security issues.

In this day of modern communications, where national security issues travel at the speed of the twenty-four hour news cycle, fighting fires occupies a lot of time for the NSC.

Most folks that work within the process complain that the current national security structure, implemented as a result of the 1947 National Security Act, is an outdated relic of the Cold War – too cumbersome to maintain pace with the current threats to our national security.

Enter retired Marine Corps General (former Commandant of the Marine Corps) James L. Jones, Obama’s choice to be national security advisor (Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs).  Jones is in a position to modernize the national security decision making structure.

The NSC is as powerful as the president wants it to be – that is to say if the president is involved with his NSC, than his national security advisor and the council will be powerful.

All indications suggest that Obama will be heavily involved in the national security decision making process, and that Jones will hold significant sway within the interagency for orchestrating the information that Obama receives and makes his decisions with.

The below Washington Post article describes Obama’s presidential directive (his first) for the organization of his national security council.  The directive adds the attorney general, the secretaries of energy and homeland security, and the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations as statutory members of the formal National Security Council.

National Security Structure Is Set

“Obama's security directive…establishes an elaborate system of interagency policy committees to coordinate analysis and reviews of issues "for consideration by the more senior committees . . . and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President."

Time will tell if Obama will stay true to the organization and the processes of the NSC.  After all, the NSC is designed to provide the president with the best advice possible for making national security decisions.  However, history shows that most presidents, when confronted with difficult national security decisions, rely on a small number of trusted advisors and pay lip service to the NSC.